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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
UNIVERSAL UNDERWRITERS 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
a Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
ALLSTATE INSURANCE \ 
COMP ANY, a Corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
11176 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is an action brought by plaintiff-appellant 
to recover from the defendant-respondent amounts 
of money spent by the appellant in settling a per-
sonal injury action brought against Olsen Chevro-
let, Inc., which was the insured under a liability 
policy issued by the respondent and also by the ap-
pellant. The respondent has relied below and on ap-
peal upon its automobile business exclusion to ex-
clude any liability for said accident and resulting 
injuries. Appellant and Respondent have both sub-
mitted briefs on that question. No further statement 
of facts will be attempted inasmuch as it would 
merely be repetitive of appellant's main brief. 
1 
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The purpose of appellant's reply brief is to re. 
spond to respondent's Statement of Facts and fo 
Point Three of respondent's brief. 
REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant wishes to clarify the record in re. 
gards to respondent's statement of fact that the 
"'other insurance" provision in its policy is excess 
over any other collectible insurance. The portion of 
respondent's policy quoted in its Statement of Facts 
does not portray fully the ''other insurance" clause 
contained in said policy. Exhibit Dl herein provides 
the full "other insurance" provisi'on which states: 
"Allstate shall not be liable under this 
Part 1 for a greater proportion of any loss 
than the applicable limit of liability stated on, 
the Supplement Page bears to the total appli· · 
cable limit of liability of all collectible insur· 
ance against such loss; provided, however, the 
insurance with respect to a temporary sub· 
stitute automobile or a non-owned automobile 
shall be excess insurance over any other col· 
lectible insurance." 
REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S POINT THREE 
Respondent indicates in Point Three of its brief 
that should the court rule that the automobile exclu· 
sion does not apply, that the court then should hold 
that the appellant's coverage is primary and the 
respondent's was secondary. This conclusion is er· i 
roneous inasmuch as respondent's po 1 icy in the 
"other insurance" clause provides for a pro-rata dis· i 
2 
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tribution of coverage except in respect to tempor-
1 ary substitute or non-owned automobiles, where it 
is excess. The respondent wishes to place itself in the 
position of covering a temporary substitute or non-
owned automobile; however, such is impossible un-
der the facts of this case. Here the automobile in-
volved in the collision was the named automobile 
under the respondent's policy, and thus the respon-
dent can hardly claim that it was a non-owned or 
temporary substitute automobile. The respondent 
must provide coverage from the standpoint of the 
automobile and its owner and not from the stand-
point of the driver. 
On the other hand, the "other insurance" clause 
contained in the appellant's policy provides as fol-
lows: 
"If the i n s u r e d has other insurance 
against a loss covered by this policy, the com-
pany shall not be liable under this policy for 
a greater proportion such loss than the appli-
cable limit of liability stated in the declara-
tion bears to the total applicable limit of 
liability of all valid and collectible insurance 
against such loss; provided, however, the in-
surance under this policy with respect 'to loss 
arising out of ~he !llaintenance or use of a_ny 
hired automobile msured on a cost of hire 
basis or the use of any non-owned automobile 
shall be excess insurance over any other valid 
and collectible insurance." 
Here the non-owned automobile excess provision 
correctly applies for the coverage is determined 
3 
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from the driver's standpoint and not from the 
standpoint of the automobile. In other words, as 
to the driver and his insurer, it was a use of 
non-owned automobile; however, as to the auto. 
mobile and its insurer, the use was not of a non. 
owned automobile but rather was the use of the 
described automobile under that policy. Thus, the 
coverage situation is as follows: the respondent's 
policy provides a pro-rata coverage, and the appel-
lant's policy provides an excess coverage. 
Where pro-rata and excess clauses conflict, the 
courts have uniformly held 'that the policy with the 
pro-rata clause insuring the automobile is primary, 
and the excess clause covering the non-owner driver 
is excess. The general rule is stated in 76 ALR 2nd 
505 where the court first of all noted that courts 
have used varying rationale for arriving at their 
conclusions and then proceeded to conclude: 
"Despite the foregoing, the cases seem 
susceptible of a certain amount of generaliza· 
tion. Thus, if the non-ownership coverage of· 
f ered by one of the policies involved is of the 
'excess insurance' type, the conclusion is gen· 
erally reached - no matter how various the 
reasoning adopted in support of it a~d t~e 
di'fferent cases may be -· 'that the pohcy is· 
sued to the owner of the vehicle is the 'pri-
mary' policy, and the company issuing it is 
liable up to the limits of the po!icy with~ut 
apportionment, although the policy C?l!tai~s 
a pro-rata clause. ·To sta:te the proposition in 
another way: if one policy has been issued 
to the owner of the vehicle causing damage, 
4 
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and another covers the same loss by virtue 
of the relationship to the accident of one who 
is not the vehicle owner, the latter's insurer 
at least where its coverage is of the 'exces~ 
insurance' variety, is in the favorable position 
and need not assume any 'of the loss, although 
the vehicle owner's policy contains a pro-rata 
clause ... " 
The annotation then proceeds to discuss the 
following cases which support the proposition that 
the owner's policy with the pro-rata provision pro-
vides the primary coverage: American Surety Com-
pany vs. Canal Insurance Company, 258 F. 2nd 934 
(1958, CA 4 S.C.); Maryland In Neighbours vs. 
Harleysville Mutual Casualty Company, 169 F. 
Supp. 368 (1959, DC Md); Citizens Mutual Auto-
mobile Insurance Company vs. Liberty Mutual In-
surance Company, 273 F. 2nd 189 (1959, CA6 
Michigan); United Services Automobile Association 
vs. Russom, 241 F. 2nd 296 (1957, CA5 Texas); 
Mountain States Mutual Casualty Company vs. 
American Casualty Company, 135 Montana 475, 342 
Pac. 2nd 748 (1959); American Motorists Insur-
ance Company vs. Weir, 46 Atlantic 2nd 7, (Con-
necticut, 1946); Busch & Company vs. Liberty Mut-
ual Insurance Company, 158 N.E. 2nd 351 (Massa-
chusetts, 1959); Eicher vs. Universal Underwriters, 
83 N.W. 2nd 895 (Minnesota, 1957); General Ac-
cident, Fire & Life Assurance Corporation vs. Pi-
azza, 152 N.E. 2nd 236 (New York, 1958); Amer-
ican Surety Company vs. A m e r i c an Indemnity 
Company, 72 A. 2nd 798 (New Jersey, 1950); Con-
5 
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tinental Casualty vs. American Fidelity & Casualty 
Company, 275 F. 2nd 381 (Illinois, 1960); Turpin 
vs. Standard Reliance Insurance Co11ipany, 99 N.W. 
2nd 26 (Nebraska, 1959); American Auto Insur-1 
ance Company vs. Republic Indemnity Company, 
341 Pac. 2nd 675 (California, 1959); Pacific In-
demnity Company vs. California State Automobile 
Association, 12 Cal. Reporter 20; National Indem-
nity Company vs. Lead Supplies, Inc., 195 F. Supp. 
249 (DC Minnesota) ; Lindon & Lancashire Insur-
ance Company vs. Government Employees Insurance 
Company, 168 A. 2nd 855, New Jersey; Motorists 
Mutual Insurance Company vs. Lumbermans Mutii-
al Insurance Company, 205 N.E. 2nd 67, Ohio; and 
Safeco Insurance Company vs. Pacific Indemnity 
Company, 401 Pac. 2nd 205, Washington. The latter 
case is typical of all of the cases cited. There the 
owner of the vehicle was an automobile dealership 
whose insurer issued a policy containing a pro-rata 
clause, the driver of the vehicle was a prospective 
purchaser whose insurance policy contained an ex-
cess insurance while driving a non-owned automo-
bile. The court held that the dealer's policy was the 
primary insurance. 
Appellant has been able to find two Utah cases 
which are in point. National Farmers Union Prop-
erty & Casualty Company vs. Farmers Insurance 
Group, 14 Utah 2nd 89, 377 Pac. 2nd 786 (1963), 
wherein the situation was just the reverse of the 
present case. There the car was owned by an em-
6 
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ployee of the automobile dealer, which had been 
loaned to a customer while his vehicle was being re-
paired. Without stating what types of "other insur-
ance" clauses were contained therein, the court 
stated that the insurance on the owner was primary 
and the insurance of the driver was excess. The 
provisions as contained in the present policies being 
standard, we would assume that the same provisions 
were contained in the policies in that case. 
The second case which is even more helpful is 
the case of Russell vs. Paulson, 18 Utah 2nd 157, 
417 Pac. 2nd 658 ( 1966) . There the court was con-
cerned with the construction of the 1"other insur-
ance" provisions in regards to uninsured motorist 
coverage. The owner and driver of the insured ve-
hicle had a policy which provided a pro-rata cover-
age where the insured was the named insured under 
other similar insurance. The passenger in the car 
who was injured had a policy of insurance which 
provided that the coverage was excess where said 
insured was injured while occupying a non-owned 
automobile. The court stated on page 159 to 160: 
"Where there is a conflict between a pro-rata and 
an excess 'other insurance' clause, a majority of the 
courts imposed primary liability on the pro-rata in-
surer and hold the excess insurer responsible only 
for secondary coverage of the loss." 
"The pro-rata clause is consid~red ~n­
operative on the theory that the policy with 
the excess provision is not the "other insur-
ance" required for its application; the excess 
7 
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clause, on the other hand, is held to limit its 
policy to only secondary coverage, leaving the 
pro-rata insurer liable to the limits of its 
policy." 
The court then stated after reviewing the min-
ority position set forth in the case of Lamb-Wes ton, 
In(',., vs. Oregon Automobile Insurance Company, 
346 Pac. 2nd 643 (Oregon, 1959): 
"The reasoning of the Oregon court is 
persuasive, but we are construing to adopt 
the majority rule which imposes primary lia-
bility on the pro-rata insurer and secondary 
liability on the excess insurer." 
Thus, it is clear that the rule of Utah and that 
of the overwhelming majority of the states is that 
the insurer of the owner of the vehicle having a pro-
rata "other insurance" clause provides the primary 
coverage, and the non-owner driver's insurer with 
an excess ''other insurance" clause is excess only. 
With this established, it is obvious that where the 
excess carrier undertakes the defense of the lawsuit 
after the primary carrier denies coverage, that it is 
entitled to recover from said primary carrier the 
amount of money spent in the settlement and the ex-
penses incurred therein. This point was specifically 
decided in the previously cited case of National Far-
mers Union Property & Casualty Company vs. Far· 
mers Insurance Group, supra, wherein this court 
held that the excess or secondary insurer was en-
ti tied to recover from the primary insurer the ex-
8 
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penses and other costs involved in settling with the 
injured plaintiff. 
Appellant respectfully submits that the respon-
dent has the primary responsibility for coverage in 
this case and that it should therefore reimburse the 
appellant the amounts expended in settling the claim. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON & GARRETT 
W. BRENT WILCOX, Esq. 
520 Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellant 
By W. Brent Wilcox 
9 
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